Trial Graphics: Wrongful Death: Arctic Rose: TMBA

“Dangerous Waters”
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The Bering Strait in Alaska is one of the most dangerous paths in the world. So when the Arctic Rose sank on April 1st, 2001, it seemed that the Strait had simply claimed another victim. But this time, there was one key difference: no one knew why the Arctic Rose had gone down. Somewhere, the Arctic Rose lies beneath these icy waters, the victim of the worst U.S. fishing accident in a half century. The question is, why?

What caused the Seattle-based Arctic Rose fishing vessel to sink with the loss of all 15 hands in the Bering Sea likely will never be known.

But after two years and nine months of an investigation into the worst U.S. commercial fishing disaster in 50 years — which included testimony from experts and previous crew members, scientific analysis and an undersea camera’s inspection of the sunken boat — the Coast Guard yesterday offered its best guess about how it sank.

In a final report that contained 25 corrective recommendations, the Marine Board of Investigation’s most probable scenario echoed a preliminary opinion by a Coast Guard stability expert issued last fall as to the factors in the sinking:

A rough, quartering sea; carelessness in leaving key watertight doors open; a flawed design that allowed water to pour in, progressively flooding the boat. Human error in responding to the emergency probably conspired to capsize the 93-foot trawler in two to three minutes. It sank in four to eight minutes.

“Casualties are seldom caused by a single catastrophic event,” said Capt. Ron Morris, head of the Anchorage, Alaska, marine safety office, who presided over the board.

No mayday was heard, just a lonely signal relayed by satellite triggered as the vessel slipped into the sea. Only the body of the skipper, Dave Rundall, 34, was recovered.

Yesterday, his parents, Lou Ann and David Rundall of West Seattle, were among nine survivors of the dead crew members who heard the findings before they were made public.

“From the first it seemed like it would remain a mystery, and it will,” Lou Ann Rundall said.

“But we all feel better because we appreciate that the Coast Guard has taken so much time and effort to answer everything they could — especially since 9/11 and all they have had to do since then. It was a different world,” Rundall said.

The boat’s owner, David Olney of Arctic Sole Seafoods Inc. of Seattle, whose brother, Mike, was among the 15 who died, could not be reached for comment. In a news release, Arctic Sole Seafoods said it was reviewing the findings and declined comment.

Morris, Cmdr. John Bingaman, Lt. Cmdr. Jim Robertson and a National Transportation Safety Board investigator made up the panel. An NTSB spokeswoman in Washington, D.C., yesterday said the two agencies agreed last fall that the Coast Guard’s report will be the only one.

With no survivors, the report is the Coast Guard’s best guess, based upon scientific analysis and testimony from past crew members and boat builders. It goes like this:

At 3:30 a.m. on April 2, 2001, the Arctic Rose was traveling downwind in a rough “quartering” sea — one coming at the boat from behind at a 45-degree angle — and the roughest kind for the Arctic Rose. The mate likely was on watch in the wheelhouse.

With swells of 20 feet, a wave washed across the trawl deck through the rear watertight hatch carelessly tied open, usually for air or to take smoke breaks. It was seen that way by an underwater robot camera that checked out the wreck in 2001.

As the boat heeled to starboard, someone in the pilothouse, feeling the heel but unaware of the open door, committed a human error. He jogged left, or to port, to right it. This only heeled the boat farther to starboard, letting more water pour in, according to the report. The underwater camera revealed the rudder frozen to its port turning position and deck-gear dangling off the starboard side.

Lt. George Borlase of the Marine Safety Center in Washington, D.C., a stability expert who previewed the report in November in a marine technology magazine, said he’s seen only one other catastrophe that resembles the Arctic Rose’s. On Feb. 8, 1974, the 213-foot long British fishing trawler Gaul disappeared in an Arctic Sea gale off Norway with all 36 crew members.

Rundall said what helps her family is the effort the panel put into the investigation, coming up with recommendations to prevent tragedies.

They include installing watertight doors alarmed with a visual and audible system in the pilothouse; revising fishing vessel construction standards to avoid free-flow of water through a vessel, perhaps by “maze” designs; documenting mandatory drills; requiring high-water alarms in processing spaces; and making the vessel-stability booklet used by naval architects and engineers easier for mariners to understand.

The panel also recommended that the rest of the nation do what Coast Guard inspectors in Seattle and Alaska now do — conduct dockside boardings of fishing vessels prior to high-risk fisheries.

The board sent its recommendations to Rear Adm. T.H. Gilmour. He agreed with most but weakened some, such as removing grandfather provisions exempting some vessels from meeting stability requirements. Gilmour preferred voluntary compliance.

Asked whether he agreed, Morris was diplomatic. “I’m going to have to stick with the party line on this,” he said. “We see movement forward … so I’m pleased.”

The full report and recommendations can be found online at www.uscg.mil/d13/default.htm. Click on “News” and follow links to the report.

Vessel Sinking Cases

Arctic Rose Sinking

Fifteen men lost their lives when the Arctic Rose sank in the Bering Sea in April of 2001. The sinking of the Arctic Rose was one of the worst commercial fishing accidents in the last 100 years, resulting in an extensive United States Coast Guard investigation into the vessel’s loss. Weather at the time of the Arctic Rose sinking was reported to be 45 knot winds, with waves to 24 feet. No mayday message was issued by the vessel, and a deployed EPIRB alerted the Coast of the vessel sinking.

The Arctic Rose was a 92-foot-long head and gut catcher processor. The vessel was originally built in 1988 in Biloxi, Mississippi, and outfitted for fishing shrimp. The Coast Guard was unable to discover any plans for the vessel, and it is unknown as to whether the vessel was originally constructed in accordance with any recognized standards. The vessel was reportedly plagued with engine, shaft, and trawl equipment problems, forcing its owners to file for bankruptcy in 1995. The vessel remained tied up in Seattle for two years. Following a change in ownership, in 1999 the vessel underwent significant structural changes. There were a large number of weights added, removed, and relocated on the Arctic Rose, without new calculations being made to determine if the vessel was safe to operate. The owner did not contact a naval architect to evaluate the effects of the weight changes on the vessel stability.

The Coast Guard casualty investigation found that the Arctic Rose was not in compliance with operating instructions issued by the owner’s naval architects. The Coast Guard located the Arctic Rose on the bottom of the ocean and deployed a remote operated vehicle to videotape the wreckage. The videotape showed the aft starboard door in the processing deck to be open, and the guillotine closure for the starboard discharge chute to be partially open. The Coast Guard investigation concluded the processing space was not watertight, as required by the operating instructions. Additionally, the Coast Guard found the vessel not to be loaded in accordance with the stability guidelines issued by the naval architects. The Coast Guard further found that the Arctic Rose was operating as a fish processing vessel, and was required to be load lined. This would have required the vessel to have a load line issued by a classification society, and have a survey or third party-issued Certificate of Compliance. According to the Coast Guard, head and gut vessels such as the Arctic Rose, are not permitted to engage in fish processing operations without proper documentation and certification.

Maritime wrongful death suits were filed in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington for all 15 of the deceased crewmen. Beard Stacey & Jacobsen LLP represented six of the deceased crewmen, and was appointed by the court to act as one of the lead legal counsel on the claims. The amount of the settlements for the deceased crewmen remains confidential. In the subsequent maritime wrongful death lawsuits filed for the crew of the Arctic Rose, their families claimed the owners of the Arctic Rose were negligent in making alterations and changes to the Arctic Rose without conducting a proper stability analysis. The families further claimed the crew of the Arctic Rose was inexperienced and lacked proper training. Few of the crewmen had prior fishing experience, and had limited training on abandon ship and survival training. Notably, three of the crewmen were foreign nationals from Mexico, working under assumed names. Damages recovered for the deceased crewmen’s families included damages for pre-death pain and suffering, loss of economic support, loss of care, nurture and guidance, and funeral and memorial expenses. Beneficiaries of the wrongful death and survival actions under federal maritime law included the spouses, children, parents, and dependent relatives of the deceased crewmen.

Like the sinking of the Aleutian Enterprise in 1990, the sinking of the Arctic Rose emphasizes the importance of protecting against progressive down flooding, by keeping closed all doors and openings to compartments designed to be watertight. Furthermore, strict adherence to stability instructions and frequent consultation with qualified marine architects is necessary when making structural changes to fishing vessels. Tragedy can strike in moments if safety precautions are not followed on a vessel. According to calculations performed by the Coast Guard, the Arctic Rose would a have sank in less than two minutes, assuming progressive down flooding through the improperly left open aft doorway to the processing area.

The sinkings of the Aleutian Enterprise and the Arctic Rose were a major factor in revisions and additions to the Fishing Vessel Safety Act, 46 CFR Sec. 28. The Fishing Vessel Safety Act requires stability analysis to be performed when major structural and weight changes are made that may impact a vessel’s stability. The Fishing Vessel Safety Act also requires alarms to prevent against down flooding of certain compartments and holds, and for check valves to be installed in vessel piping. Importantly, the Fishing Vessel Safety Act also requires that crew aboard commercial fishing vessels conduct regular safety training and drills, such as donning emersion suits and abandoning ship, and that vessels have basic safety equipment such as emersion suits, life rafts, and EPIRBs.

Beard Stacey & Jacobsen, LLP

Resources:
http://www.tmba.tv/trial-graphics/trial-graphics-wrongful-death-arctic-rose/

http://www.atsealawyer.com/CM/CaseHistories/CaseHistories10.asp

http://www.seattlepi.com/local/155952_rose09.html

http://web.archive.org/web/20051207030913/www.courttv.com/onair/shows/extreme_evidence/episodes/115.html